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Abstract. Simple linear approach prevalent in the majority of healthcare incident 
analyses has been the target of criticism and is not felt to be effective in complex 
systems, such as healthcare. STAMP (System Theoretic Accident Modelling and 
Process) is felt to be a promising method for the improvement of healthcare 
incident analysis. This study, therefore, aims to explore the applicability pf 
STAMP in healthcare through the case study of the STAMP application to the 
large-scale organisational failure at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust between 2005-
2009. The effectiveness of the STAMP applications was evaluated with feedback 
from healthcare stakeholders on the usability and utility of STAMP. Healthcare 
stakeholders were generally positive about the utility of STAMP in providing a 
system view and guiding consideration of interactions between system 
components. However, many felt it to be complicated method that would 
specialist expertise to apply. From the findings of the research, recommendations 
are made to improve STAMP and to assist future applications of STAMP in 
healthcare.  
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1 Background 
Current healthcare incident analysis processes are felt to produce ineffective remedial 
actions, often focusing on the retraining of individuals and small policy change. Issues 
with the quality of incident analyses have been linked to the choice of analyst and 
analytical approach; with investigations conducted by clinical staff that lack safety 
expertise, using Root Cause Analysis (RCA), a method that often describes incidents 
as being the result of a linear chain of events [1, 2].  
This research project aimed to investigate the applicability of Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) in the analysis of patient safety incidents in 
UK healthcare. As an accident causation model and analytical approach, STAMP 
strongly embodies the concepts of systems theory and provides an analysis of human 
decision-making. Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) may be used to guide the 
2 
analysis of patient safety incidents to consideration of system safety and sustainable 
solutions for patient safety issues. Nonetheless, the healthcare stakeholders that conduct 
incident investigations have very limited exposure to STAMP. For successful adoption 
in healthcare, STAMP would need to be introduced to, and accepted by, healthcare 
stakeholders. With this consideration, this research project aimed to apply STAMP in 
the analysis of patient safety incidents, involving healthcare stakeholders in the analysis 
and investigating their perceptions of STAMP. 
2 Methods 
The applicability of STAMP in healthcare was investigated through the large-scale 
organisational failure at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust between 2005-2009. The 
analysis in this study used the reports from the Healthcare Commission investigation 
(176 pages) [3], the independent investigation under the NHS act [4] and the public 
inquiry [5] as data. The first report consisted of two volumes (455 and 367 pages), the 
public inquiry report consisted of an executive summary (125 pages) and three volumes 
(692, 668 and 434 pages). 
Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) was applied in accordance with Leveson’s 
published guidance [6] and using the organisational error taxonomy provided by 
Stringfellow [7]. An initial analysis was conducted by the author with the analysis 
outcomes discussed with another HFE researcher until an agreement was reached. The 
safety control structure and further analysis on safety-related responsibilities, context, 
unsafe decision and control actions, and mental model and feedback flaws at multiple 
levels of the control structure were carried out prior to the engagement with the 
healthcare stakeholders. The control structure was presented on an A3 sized page and 
further analyses were carried out with healthcare participants. 
Eighteen healthcare professionals involved in patient safety work were recruited for 
interviews/workshop. Each interview/workshop started with a half-hour presentation 
on the STAMP background, concept and principles. The control structures (Figure 1) 
created by the researchers was validated by healthcare participants first and further 
CAST analyses (Figure 2) were facilitated. The participants’ feedback on the usability 
and utility of STAMP were collected using a set of the statements/questions and a 5-
point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly 
agree).  
3 Results 
3.1 STAMP analysis 
Figure 1 shows the safety control structure developed in the analysis providing an 
overview of the system. Due to the size of the control structure, a simplified diagram is 
provided. The further full CAST analysis is very detailed, so only one example at a 





















































Fig. 1. Mid-Staffordshire incidents control structure (simplified) 
4 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Ensure quality and safety of patient care
• Ensure learning and improvement following 
investigation of incidents and complaints
• Manage systems for the management of risk to 
patient safety and wellbeing. Ensure reporting of 
serious incidents to SHA and NPSA
Context:
• Responsibil ity for most of risk management and 
governance system devolved to divisions in 2007
• Trust cost improvement plan in action with 
board setting savings plan and divisions 
responsible for implementation
• Cost improvement plans were identified as a risk 
to patient safety and wellbeing
• High staff turnover and sickness, difficulty 
recruiting 
• Changes in staff skill mix resulted in a lack of 
senior nurses and increase in support staff
• Disconnect between clinical staff and 
management with clinicians feeling their 
concerns were ignored
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Failed to 
maintain high standards of care
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: Complaints and incident investigations 
undertaken by frontline staff. Staff lacked training 
and time for investigation resulting in varied quality
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Surgical 
division described as dysfunctional in RCS review
• Inadequate enforcement of constraints: Problems in 
medical and surgical divisions often listed on risk 
register but not resolved
• Inadequate allocation of resources: A&E had issues 
with low staffing levels, lack of leadership, lack of 
equipment and lack of high quality training
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Clinicians felt concerns were not listened to by 
trust leadership and the trust focused on 
financial strategy
• A closed culture among clinicians with reluctance 
to adopt national guidance such as from NICE 
Safety-related responsibilities:
• Improve patient care and outcomes through 
systematic review, evaluation and implementation of 
change
• Ensure high standards of care, hygiene and 
cleanliness are maintained
Context:
• Continual change in clinical leadership at board 
level – clinical governance predominantly 
overseen by director of nursing
• Clinical governance lead did not feel adequately 
trained or experienced for role
• No lead for clinical audit for a year prior to April 
2007
• Clinical audit lead had other research and 
development commitments and a substantial 
workload
• Director of infection control role regularly 
changed between personnel
• Improvements in infection control in 2008 noted 
by DH and HCC
Unsafe decisions and control actions:
• Inadequate safety management and learning 
processes: 
• Clinical audit weak and disjointed. Lacked planning 
and not linked to other governance
• A lack of follow-up after audits to ensure changes 
and improvements were made
• Inadequate robustness in review of patient deaths
• Did not participate in the audits of specialist medical 
and surgical societies
• Coordination and communication issues: Disconnect 
between divisions, departments within divisions and 
the central audit team
• Inadequate enforcement of safety constraints: 
Hygiene and cleanliness standards not maintained
• Inadequate interactions with external bodies: Did not 
report 2005-2006 increase of C.difficile to HPA, SHA 
and trust board
Mental model and feedback flaws:
• Filtering of information on complaints and 
incidents did not give adequate information for 
board to judge standards
• Reassured that high mortality rates were due to 
poor coding




Fig. 2. Clinical governance level analysis 
3.2 Participant responses on usability of STAMP  
Responses for STAMP’s usability are presented in Figure 3, participants were more 
negative about the usability of STAMP than they were its utility, with 45% of 
participants disagreeing that it was easy to understand (72% neutral or negative) and 
34% disagreeing that it was easy to apply (78% neutral or negative). Responses on 
usability are dependent on the way STAMP was presented and the time available to 
explain and demonstrate STAMP. Several participants made comments about needing 
more time and practice with the method, however, they were largely positive about the 
presentation of STAMP (56% positive responses) and the provision of templates in the 




Fig. 3. Healthcare participants’ perception on STAMP usability (n=18) 
3.3 Participant responses on utility of STAMP  
The scale-based responses on the utility of STAMP in healthcare are presented in 
Figure 4. Most of the responses were positive, particularly in terms of STAMP’s 
relevance to healthcare and the method giving a different perspective, with 78% of 
participants giving a positive rating (agree or strongly agree). Participants were more 
negative about how useful the application of STAMP was in learning from the incident 
and in helping to make recommendations (17% disagreeing to both statements), the 
reasoning behind this is explored further in the answers to open-ended questions. 
 
 













































The application of STAMP to the Mid-Staffordshire case organised the public inquiry 
data into a format of control-feedback structure and process models for human decision-
making. STAMP was a good fit for the issues of vertical alignment within the hospital 
and connections to external organisations. STAMP was both descriptive and revealing 
in providing a way of organising and communicating the underlying system issues. One 
benefit of the use of STAMP was the visual output in the safety control structure 
diagram and process models, which allowed for discussion of the case with participants. 
Healthcare stakeholders were generally positive about STAMP’s utility, but less 
positive about its usability. A main theme arising from the healthcare stakeholder 
comments regarded a system versus person perspective in viewing incidents and 
incident cause. In keeping with Reason’s [8] warning for issues at the extremities of 
both a system and person perspective. Some participant comments displayed a wariness 
of the systems view of STAMP and the potential detraction from individual 
responsibility and professionalism that is highly valued in healthcare. Along with issues 
of underplaying the role of personalities and attitudes in safety management, there was 
a concern that a high-level system view may not consider the detail and nuances of 
healthcare work. Taking a system view the impact of personalities and attitudes could 
be considered as a failure of the system to effectively identify and control for these 
issues [9] but it may still be that a STAMP-based investigation overlooks these types 
of problems.  
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